States with weak institutions can lose from trade with strong states when trade is subject to predation. The happy liberal idea of trade fostering better institutions and peace can be turned on its head. The Ricardian model of trade subject to predation offered here implies imperialism without capital, contra Marxists. Weak and poor South trades with strong and rich North. Poor South labor is attracted to predation. Labor market effects of predation and enforcement amplify opposing interests in the terms of trade, potentially obviating the standard gains from trade that allows bargaining solutions to surplus division.
to intervention by more powerful states in the civil conflict of weaker states. Thus it relates to a wider literature on economic determinants of conflict (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2007) .
The model suggests new perspectives for the theory of international trade relations. The standard theory (Bagwell and Staiger, 2004) 
Theory Outline
Internal production and exchange is assumed secure to simplify the model sufficiently to focus on international interaction of governments in enforcement. (Predation on production at local levels induces emergence of local order provision to limit its damage, the subject of a related literature (Grossman, 2002 , for example) pushed to the background here along with its emphasis on the efficiency tradeoff between reduction of predation and the tendency for the order providers to enrich themselves at the expense of those protected. ) Start with the familiar 2 good 2 country Ricardian model with identical Cobb-Douglas preferences. As in Anderson and Marcouiller (2005) , labor may choose to prey on trade, while in equilibrium the predators come exclusively from the poorer country (South). Predation is either classic theft or, equivalently and more generally, extortion. Departing from Anderson- Marcouiller, costly enforcement is introduced.
1 Key characteristics of the two economies and their iceberg costs of international trade determine the type of order provision that emerges.
The familiar asymmetry between North and South in the form of absolute advantage favoring North is potentially amplified by absolute advantage in enforcement.
Predation on trade of either country's exports has similar implications for sources of conflict in trade relations. 2 The incentives of North and South on enforcement are in conflict.
The table below reports the results of enforcement on North and South terms of trade for the two polar cases of predation on North exports and on South exports and contrasts them 1 Anderson-Marcouiller is altered in several other ways as well. Domestic order is assumed such that insurance allows predation risk to be diversified, and predation is on trade falls asymmetrically on the two goods. The predators are assumed to be integrated into the domestic market for exchange of goods.
2 Asymmetry between predation on trade on either North's exports or South's exports is potentially more interesting. Think of predation on the approaches to South's port. On the seaward side, North's exports may be exposed to extortion as they near the port. On the landward side, South's exports may be exposed to extortion as they near the port. A plausible simplifying assumption is that the market in the port itself is secure.
3 The polar cases suggest specialization in predation depending on the characteristics of the goods. Asymmetric predation results when some goods are more easily stolen or more attractive to steal. For example, high value to weight or volume ratios makes goods more attractive to predators, all else equal. Perishability and other handling characteristics also affect the relative attractiveness of shipments to predators. While there are some interesting differences, the analysis confirms a deeper similarity. The model development in the text thus focuses on the polar case of predation by poor South on rich North's export. The alternative polar case is analyzed in the appendix: predation by South on South's export.
with the benchmark equilibrium case of no predation. Which cell is actually the equilibrium depends on underlying parameters. Equilibrium with no predation results when trade is sufficiently beneficial for poor South. 
The larger is the South labor supply L * relative to the North labor supply L, the better are North's terms of trade p. Improvements in South technology (a fall in unit labor requirement a * 2 ) have the same effect.
Up to an irrelevant positive constant, indirect trade utility is given by
(It is straightforward to confirm that there are mutual gains from trade.) Because of the assumption that South has higher unit labor requirements than North in both goods (an absolute disadvantage in all goods), the South real wage is lower than the North real wage.
These are the building blocks for the model of insecure trade.
Trade with Predation
The model of Section 1 has no predation and no enforcement; markets work perfectly at no cost to governments. In this section, potential productive workers may choose predation over production when predation (extortion or theft) pays well enough. Given the low wage One important new feature is specialized predation: predators prey on one of the goods as goods approach the market, plausibly it pays to specialize. Another new feature is enforcement. Because R * is endogenous, so is South's labor N * − E * − R * regardless of enforcement
The probability of successful shipment is
where the enforcement probability E is a function of enforcement labor by North and South:
Parameter A ≥ 1 is the absolute advantage of North labor in enforcement. In (2) the shippers and predators interact in evasion/pursuit with a logistic success rate
that decreases with the ratio of predators to shippers (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2005) and the relative effectiveness of predators in finding prey, θ. Enforcers defeat a fraction M of successful matches of predators to prey (assumed to always result in loss of shipments) with full recovery of goods. Enforcement success is a logistic function of the effective number of enforcers AE + E * in (3). The numbers of predators and prey are suppressed as an argument in (3), rationalized as thinking of density of patrols on the limited area of approach to the port where trade occurs. Note that E E (0, 0) = 0 = E E * (0, 0) = E, so that coordination of enforcement effort is required to have any effect. That is, institutions are required.
Competitive Predation
The focus in this section is on predation on North goods ( The predators seize (1−π)(y 1 −x 1 ) of North exports. They can sell the goods in a thieves market that we assume is perfectly (for simplicity) integrated with the legitimate domestic market in South. The domestic market price is p. North sellers receive expected price πp.
The income of predators is
The left hand side of the equation gives the value of goods taken by predators while the right hand side is in the form of tariff revenue generated by a tax p − πp times the quantity imported y 1 − x 1 .
The integration of predators into the South economy implies that their income is spent in the South economy in exactly the same form as tariff revenue lump sum redistributed to identical consumers, the usual setup in trade policy models. The predators sell their goods in the integrated domestic market at price p in terms of good 2, with a rent per unit (specific tax equivalent) of p−πp per unit, effectively like a tariff in that amount. Two key differences between predation and the tariff are: (i) the predators 'ad valorem tax' rate (1 − π)/π is endogenous in contrast to an exogenous tariff, and (ii) more predation means less South output, improving South's terms of trade, all else equal.
The key indifference condition for equilibrium allocation of South labor between predation and production/trade equates the wage in production/trade 1/a * 2 with the per capita income from predation:
Use equation (2) to form an expression for 1−π and substitute into (4). Use labor market clearance in South N * − E * − R * = L * and in North N − E = L to substitute for South and North labor. Finally, solve the result for the supply of predators as a function of South price p:
where E(E, E * ) is given by equation (3).
Substitute the right hand side of (5) for R * in (2) to yield an implicit relationship between π and p. After simplification this is
The expected price received by North for its exports in insecure equilibrium is given by
where the right hand side is equivalent to (1), but now the South labor supply is endogenous in p via R * given by (4).
The equilibrium relative price of North's export p as a function of π solves (7) for p:
where
Log-differentiating (8) yields
The analysis of insecure equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1 below in (ln p, ln π) space.
The P (π) and Π(p) schedules are drawn as loglinear for simplicity, with slopes on either side of −1. When E = E * = 0 the elasticity of Π with respect to p is indeed in (0, −1) is guaranteed for Π(p), as analyzed further below to provide sufficient conditions for insecure equilibrium. Stability is guaranteed in this case.
rise in E rise in E* rise in E+E* S The diagram is very helpful in understanding the characteristics of equilibrium. The A sufficient condition for insecure equilibrium without enforcement adds intuition. 4 Two requirements must be met: North participation πp ≥ a 1 /a 2 and predation Π(p) ≤ 1. The usual participation condition for South p ≤ a * 1 /a * 2 is not necessary, as argued below, but may be met.
Proposition 1 At E = E * = 0 a unique stable insecure equilibrium exists if
Condition (9) assures that a value of p can be found in an interval that satisfies North participation and insecure trade. Intuitively, predator effectiveness θ cannot be too large relative to parameters that raise p, the equilibrium value of the goods to be extorted or stolen. Increases in South relative size N * /N and in preference for North goods γ raise equilibrium p. Rises in a 2 /a * 2 similarly act to raise South's relative size and thus p.
Proof: Sufficiency requires a condition on the relationship of parameters such that the two necessary conditions of North participation and insecure trade hold. Solve (4) for R * at E = E * = 0 and substitute in (2) to solve
Multiply both sides by p to give an expression for πp. Use North participation πp ≥ a 1 /a 2 to
Manipulate this condition to obtain
A positive measure interval in which to locate p/(a 1 /a 2 ) exists if (9) holds. QED.
If the secure trade South participation condition p < a * 1 /a * 2 is added as a requirement, then a sufficient condition is The model gives new answers to standard questions about the effect of changes in technology and relative country size on terms of trade as well as to new questions about the 5 Strictly speaking, the Ricardian model implies that each agent could incompletely specialize and constitute an infinitesimal autarkic economy. More realistically, specialization is associated with sector specific skills acquisition that make it efficient for individuals to specialize and use the domestic insecure market for autarkic exchange. Anderson and Marcouiller (2005) analyze the pure Ricardian case with individual autarkic incomplete specialization.
6 Coordination could be managed by a Mafia, analyzed in Section 4. Subsequent conflict over the monopoly rents could end in the competitive free entry equilibrium. while North must definitely benefit from a rise in πp.
Comparative Statics of Enforcement
The arrows in the Figure illustrate the effects of changes in enforcement efforts E and E * .
The P (π) schedule shifts left as E * rises and right as E rises due to the terms of trade effect of reducing labor supply in North and South. The effect of enforcement on Π(p) is given by differentiating (6) using (3) and (5). Enforcement acts directly via E to reduce R * in (5).
But indirectly, enforcement lowers R * because enforcement reduces productive labor and thus lowers the payoff to predation. The net effect depends on the effectiveness of enforcement parameter , inter alia. The arrows are drawn with the understanding that enforcement will never be used unless the net effect is to reduce predation. Thus Π E > 0, Π E * > 0. The effect of North enforcement on P is given by differentiating (8) with respect to E:
.
The comparative statics of North enforcement are obtained from differentiating (6) and (8) with respect to E:
The denominator above is positive, as previously shown. The first term in the numerator of the right hand side of each equation is the direct effect of North enforcement on security and South's inverse terms of trade p respectively. The second term is the cross effect. The direct security effect of enforcement operates through the predator/prey relationship (2).
The direct terms of trade effect of enforcement is a market size effect, as the productive labor force in North relative to South falls.
North's terms of trade change is d ln πp = d ln π + d ln p, the sum of equations (10) and (11). North's terms of trade improve because
The bracketed terms are positive, as previously established, and both Π E > 0 and P E > 0. In contrast, South's terms of trade deteriorate with North's enforcement because P E + P π Π E > 0. To see this, evaluate the total derivative of (8):
(1 − E E ). * , the realistic range for positive enforcement.
In contrast, South's enforcement effort improves South's terms of trade and may also improve North's terms of trade. The analysis substitutes P E * < 0 for P E > 0 and Π E * > 0
for Π E > 0 in (10)-(11).
The analysis here differs substantially from simple intuition about predation on trade.
Predation is like a tax on trade with the revenue going to the predators. Reducing this loss intuitively should help both seller and buyer. To make the contrast stark, suppose that enforcement was free, so that raising E did not remove labor from productive activity. Then P E = P E * = 0, and both South and North have terms of trade improve from enforcement.
South predators switching to productive labor are paid their value of marginal product in either activity, so there is no net effect at the margin. Reducing predation removes a pure source of inefficiency with the gains split between North and South. The free enforcement example reveals that it is the combination of costly enforcement and predation that makes trade relations more conflicted than in standard trade policy analysis. (In contrast, the appendix shows that with predation on South exports, the application of costless enforcement makes trade relations conflicted. Covering both cases, the source of conflict is the combination of enforcement and predation.)
The implication of the diagram and the comparative statics in (10)- (11) is that North's enforcement harms South via a negative terms of trade effect and South's enforcement ordinarily harms North via a negative terms of trade effect. This arises due to the withdrawal of labor for policing from the productive labor force and the further withdrawal of productive labor into predation in South. South enforcement may improve the security of trade enough to raise North terms of trade πp despite lowering p.
A particularly stark implication of the analysis is that, starting from an insecure trade equilibrium, the model can generate an enforcement equilibrium that is worse for South than autarky. Strictly from the formal logic of the model, it is possible that reverse specialization in South with secure exchange between locals could begin and would dominate insecure exchange through South's port. But internal exchange would be exposed to predation too, and startup costs would inhibit its evolution. Given this plausible reality, nothing in the model prevents point S being associated with a price to the right of a * 1 /a * 2 . The ability to escape this bad equilibrium to autarky presumes a powerful enough South state to be able to coordinate the choice of autarky, as noted in the discussion following Proposition 1.
Mafia Predation
An important alternative to free entry predation is a Mafia that controls the entry/exit of predators. Assume the Mafia is a price taker, but understands the predator/prey determination of the probability of success 2. The Mafia maximizes its profit, the difference between the wage bill R * /a * 2 and the expected revenue from extortion/theft. To deter entry the Mafia must enlist a fixed size force F * (the gang) assumed to be paid at the market rate 1/a * 2 . Mafias organize only for insecure markets exceeding a critical size because the market must be large enough to allow a non-negative profit. North trades only if Mafia dominated South offers terms of trade π M p M ≥ a 1 /a 2 as in the competitive entry case. The conditions for existence of insecure equilibrium change and some qualitative properties of equilibrium change.
The labor market indifference equilibrium condition (4) is replaced by the Mafia first order condition
The preceding analysis of equilibrium predation differs in some details from the free entry case, but much of Figure 1 and its intuition still applies.
Equilibrium predation is less than with free entry. In Figure 1 the Π(p, E, E * ) function shifts up and is positively sloped in contrast to the free entry of predators case. Solve (12) for R * and substitute the resulting expression into (2) to yield (after solving the quadratic equation for the positive root π) North, in contrast, has an incentive to protect the Mafia from attack by the South state.
Profit M is equal to Mafia total revenue minus total cost, wages 1/a * 2 paid to R * + F * .
Substitute the profit maximizing level of R * solved from (12) into the Mafia profit to yield:
where the inequality is the necessary condition for Mafia participation. The Mafia participation condition can alternatively be expressed as
The smallest feasible value of p/(a 1 /a 2 ) for Mafia participation is given when (14) holds with equality.
North participation requires
Using (14), the combination of Mafia and North participation implies
Evaluate Π M using (13) at p = a * 1 /a * 2 as the highest feasible price consistent with South benefit relative to autarky. Then:
Proposition 2 Mafia-controlled predation equilibrium on North exports exists with South benefit relative to autarky if
The condition in Proposition 2 is over-sufficient because it may be feasible to drive p lower than South's autarky terms of trade.
The implications of Proposition 2 in terms of the model are intuitive. The right hand side of the inequality is decreasing in θ. Higher θ reduces Π(p) given p, thus implying higher equilibrium p to satisfy the North participation condition. Higher F * /N requires higher p to meet the Mafia participation condition
Comparative Statics of Trade with Mafia Predation
The comparative statics of security with a Mafia follow readily. Changes in F * have no 
Optimal Enforcement and Interaction
Enforcement is worthwhile to North or South states if it increases utility. Enforcement must be paid for by labor drawn from production, a cost to be set against the benefit of enforcement.
North utility is V (pπ, E) = (pπ) 1−γ (N − E)/a 1 with South predation on North exports and (p/π) 1−γ (N − E)/a 1 with South predation on South exports. Letp,π denote the equilibrium p, π pairs for any given levels of enforcement, depicted in Figures 1 and 2 as the intersection points. The comparative statics in the preceding sections have signed the derivatives of the reduced form functionsp(E, E * ) andπ(E, E * ). South's reduced form
whether predation is on North goods or South goods.
The rate of change of North's utility with respect to own enforcement against South on
The right hand side gives the net benefit of shifting the fraction 1/(N − E) of North's population from production and trade to enforcement that reaps an improvement in the terms of trade. Costless initial enforcement (N − E → ∞) would always be beneficial for North, as in the classic optimal tariff analysis of terms of trade motives for tariffs. Allowing for costly enforcement, as with costly collection of tariffs, raises the bar for initial active policy to be desirable. Allowing for North labor to be relatively more effective with high A lowers the bar for North enforcement to be desirable.
The rate of change of South's utility with respect to own enforcement is
The first term is always positive when predation is on North exports, and may be negative or positive when predation is on South exports. For South on South predation, North's marginal payoff (15) changes to replacepπ withp/π. The analysis is essentially similar.
South's payoff to own enforcement has the same form as in (16). In both cases the terms of trade derivatives change to reflect the changing cases.
Turning to the interaction of enforcement policies, suppose that North finds initial enforcement to be welfare improving. South may or may not find enforcement to be welfare improving. Figure 3 below depicts enforcement space at Nash equilibrium. Point N has E > 0 and E * ≥ 0. South always loses from North enforcement, so South's utility rises as E falls. In contrast, North may gain or lose with South enforcement when predation is on North exports. This results in two different iso-utility curves for North in Figure 3 In contrast, consider the implications of point N lying at E * = 0. In this case, the lens of mutually beneficial enforcement policies is infeasible. Within the scope of the model, South can do nothing; its best move is to accept North's equilibrium enforcement choice. Outside the model, conflict is suggested. South may choose resistance to impede or destroy E. The other possibility is that North benefits from South enforcement against predation on North's export, so the lens of mutually beneficial enforcement slopes down and to the right from N located at E > 0, E * = 0. North can afford to pay South to enforce while reducing its own enforcement. This equilibrium may be achieved with some conflict but suggests a degree of benign paternalistic coordination resembling colonialism in some historical forms.
A remaining possibility is that North enforcement is so comparatively cheap and effective that elimination of predation is optimal. In that case South gains too, as the initial table reported. But this is true only for the case of predation on North's export. South loses when predation on South's export is eliminated.
Succeeding subsections draw out the implications of the incentives to enforce or to resist enforcement.
Comparative Statics of Optimal Enforcement
Shifts in technology or trade costs alter the equilibrium values of π and p, and change the enforcement incentives. Symmetric trade cost changes have no effect on the equilibrium while utility of both parties rises uniformly as the trade cost falls. If iceberg costs from
North to South fall, in contrast, the equilibrium shifts. The price of North's export becomes
Effectively, a fall in τ is like a productivity improvement (fall in a 1 ) in North. The fall in τ thus raises R * from (5). Both forces lower pπ, hence P (π) in Figure 1 shifts left; P τ < 0.
The rise in R * due to the fall in τ lowers Π(p) in Figure 1 ; Π τ < 0. While the directions of change of ln p and ln π are indeterminate, the same steps used to sign dpπ/dE reveal that dpπ/dτ < 0: North's terms of trade deteriorate due to its effective growth in size.
Interior Nash equilibrium enforcement is a rather implausible outcome and technically intricate in this setting. A plausible special case is where South does not choose to enforce, E * = 0 in Nash equilibrium. Then the knock on effect of a fall in trade costs from North to South is ordinarily an increased incentive for resistance to North enforcement by South because utility falls with a rise in E.
Tribute
An alternative to enforcement by North is payment of tribute to the predators not to prey on the goods. Intuitively, this should be a good solution if the predators are subject to an authority (the Mafia) that can enforce the agreement. Tribute equilibrium can only arise when markets are sufficiently large to cover the fixed cost F * /a * 2 of organizing the Mafia.
A tax equivalence intuition for the tribute situation seems natural: insecurity is like a tax on trade, tax incidence is shared, so paying off the predators should help both buyer and seller. The equivalence is false because the interest of South's government and Mafia diverge. The analysis compares South welfare when paid tribute, releasing erstwhile raiders into productive employment, with South welfare under the initial insecure extortion equilibrium.
The South government receives some fraction f of the Mafia profit in the extortion equilibrium and may or may not do so in the Tribute equilibrium. South welfare is defined as the combination of workers and Mafia profits for simplicity.
The terms of trade under tribute at the full rate of extortion is
South gets utility
in the Tribute equilibrium. In the extortion equilibrium under the Mafia, South gets
The sum of Mafia and labor real income in South must fall under the Tribute equilibrium, hence the Mafia cannot afford to pay the South government enough to accept the Tribute equilibrium.
A sufficiently powerful South government will prevent the Tribute equilibrium from arising, preferring extortion equilibrium. A weaker South government will not only fail to prevent the loss of real income from the terms of trade deterioration, it will also lose its share of the Mafia profit as the Mafia makes a deal with the North.
The Nash bargaining solution for the Mafia's deal with the North is the payment T that the Mafia receives to guarantee secure trade (R * = 0 ⇒ π = 1) to North. Mafia profit is
The Nash bargaining solution for the tribute payment (suppressing the irrelevant 1/a 1 ) solves
where ω ∈ (0, 1) is the bargaining parameter. The first order condition yields:
The analysis is much the same when predators prey on South's export. Tribute equilibria are associated with the release of predators into production, driving down South's terms of trade. A strong enough South government prefers the extortion equilibrium to the Tribute equilibrium. A weak government loses both terms of trade and its share of the Mafia profit. 
Denote the fraction of North exports to South going to M as z. Then the equilibrium terms of trade for M are
Taken together with p S = p M , these terms of trade conditions imply
The Mafia first order condition and the competitive entry condition for Separatist predation in combination implies that
The ratio of the second equation to the first, using the structure (2) adapted for multiple regions implies:
This structure implies that with equal predator relative efficiency and equal trade costs
The equilibrium depends on a trade friction between regions M and S. If the predation by South raiders is on South goods coming into the market, the equilibrium terms of trade for North are determined by
The South labor market indifference condition in terms of South's product is market wage 7 It is convenient to solve for r * = R * /N * , the proportion of population engaged in predation. Define n = N/N * and evaluate at zero enforcement. The roots of the quadratic are complex, with real parts that both may lie in the unit interval. If so, use the smaller root. 
Mafia Predation by South on South Goods
As with predation on North goods, the indifference condition of predator free entry is replaced by a monopoly Mafia selection of the profit maximizing number of predators based on understanding the predator prey relationship taking prices and the productive labor supply as given. The analysis remains qualitatively identical to the free entry case and the logic of Figure 2 continues to hold. The difference is that predation is lower and the Mafia makes a profit M.
